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STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE RECOVERIES
I. INTRODUCTION
During the mid-1970s, medical malpractice insurance premiums for
health care providers increased dramatically.' In response to the per-
ceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, many states adopted legis-
lation designed to lower premiums by limiting a patient's right to sue
for malpractice injuries.2 One such measure, in which the court places
a limit on the amount of recoverable damages in a medical malpractice
1. For example, from 1972 to 1975 premium rates for Class I health care providers
(usually general practitioners) in Arizona rose from $612 to $1,595 per year, an increase
of 161%. Rates for Class V physicians (usually anesthesiologists and some types of
surgeons) in Arizona increased 146%, from $3,700 to $9,119. See HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (Mar. 17, 1975) (Medical Malpractice Background Papers by
Congressman James F. Hastings) [hereinafter OVERVIEW-BACKGROUND PAPERS].
In Michigan, Class I premiums rose 278%, from $194 to $735 in 1975 alone. Class V
premiums rose 10% in 1975 from $2,676 to $4,551. Some rates in Michigan rose as
much as 658%. Id. at 211.
2. States have adopted, with varying degrees of success, several types of laws limit-
ing the right to sue for malpractice injuries. These laws include the following:
(1) Requirements that medical malpractice cases be submitted to a review panel.
See Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N.J. Super. 407, 423 A.2d 670 (1980) (constitutional); Lacy v.
Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1981) (constitutional); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d
1187 (Mont. 1981) (constitutional); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (un-
constitutional); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (unconstitutional); Everett v. Goldman, 359 S.2d 1256 (La.
1978) (constitutional); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978)
(constitutional); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977) (con-
stitutional).
(2) The abolition of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases. The
collateral source rule provides that "if an injured person receives compensation for his
injuries from a source wholly independent of the tort-feasor, the payment should not be
deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the tort-feasor."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 238 (5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., Doran v. Priddy, 534 F.
Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981) (unconstitutional); Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hosp., 403
So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (constitutional); Pinnillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp.,
403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981) (constitutional); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374,
404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (constitutional); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,
293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980) (constitutional); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570
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action, is particularly burdensome to the patient injured as a result of
P.2d 744 (1977) (constitutional); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343
N.E.2d 832 (1976) (unconstitutional).
(3) Limitations on attorney contingency fees. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-568 (Supp. 1985) (fee subject to review by court); IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (Supp.
1985) (fee limited to 40% of recovery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-120 (Supp. 1985) (fee
limited to 331/3% of recovery).
(4) Laws modifying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in medical malpractice cases. See
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1982).
(5) Laws shortening the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. See,
e.g., Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983) (constitutional); Stephens v.
Snyder Clinic Assoc., 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (constitutional); Mishek v.
Stanton, 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (1980) (constitutional); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner,
274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980) (constitutional); Ross v. Kansas City General
Hosp. & Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980) (constitutional); Carson v. Mau-
rer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (unconstitutional); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.
2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1979) (constitutional).
(6) Tighter rules on qualifications of expert witnesses. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-2602 (1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, q 58.2-.10 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41A.020 (1979). See generally Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
Although states have pursued various methods of alleviating the perceived medical
malpractice crisis, Congress has never enacted legislation concerning malpractice limits.
Several bills dealing with the problem, however, were introduced in 1975. Senator Gay-
lord Nelson introduced the Federal Malpractice Insurance Act (S. 188, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1975), which provided for the establishment of a National Medical Malpractice
Development Fund. The fund would have paid all medical malpractice claims above
$25,000. Voluntary payments by insurers engaged in medical malpractice insurance
would have financed the fund. OVERVIEW-BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 1, at
28.
Senators Daniel Inouye and Edward Kennedy also introduced legislation. The first
bill, the National Medical Injury Compensation Insurance Act (S. 215, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1975), would have established a no-fault system of compensation for medical inju-
ries. Doctors and other health care providers would pay premiums into a compensation
fund, which would be used to pay claims made by injured patients. Patients would have
the option of applying for compensation either to the fund or through the courts. The
second bill, the National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 1975
(S. 482, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1975), would have required participation by both claimants
and health care providers to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes. Although the arbi-
tration would not be binding, the arbitration panel decision would be admissible as
evidence in any court proceeding. See OVERVIEW-BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note
1, at 28-29.
Congresswoman Marjorie Holt introduced a bill that would have established a Com-
mission on Medical Malpractice Awards (H.R. 1305, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1975). The
Commission would conduct a study on the feasibility of establishing medical malprac-
tice damage limits. Congressman Dan Rostenkowski introduced a similar bill (H.R.
1378, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1975), providing for a study to be conducted by the Nation-
ale Academy of Sciences.
Most recently Congressmen Richard Gephardt and Henson Moore introduced the
Alternative Medical Liability Act (H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1984). This bill
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malpractice. Although such laws raise substantial constitutional ques-
tions,3 the United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to
pass judgment on their validity.
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group4 the Supreme Court dismissed
a challenge to a California law that limits noneconomic losses in medi-
cal malpractice actions to $250,000.' Justice White dissented, arguing
that a substantial federal question existed.6 He noted that two states
7
upheld the constitutionality of medical malpractice damage limits,
while four states8 invalidated the challenged laws on federal constitu-
tional grounds. Justice White felt the Court should address the judicial
split concerning this issue.
The medical malpractice damage limit issue focuses on whether the
due process clause requires a state to provide an adquate compensation
scheme to malpractice plaintiffs when it replaces those plaintiffs' com-
mon law right to recover full damages.9
would apply only to states that have not enacted their own medical malpractice reforms
by 1987. If a state fails to act, the bill applies to all patients whose care is paid for by
the federal government. Damages include only economic losses (lost income, medical
expenses, and attorneys' fees) and not non-economic losses (loss of earning capacity,
pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium).
3. Challengers to medical malpractice damages caps have relied primarily on the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. They argue that
the law violates due process by depriving the injured patient of his right under common
law to fully recover his damages. Challengers claim that the damage limits violate equal
protection by discriminating against only those plaintiffs who are severely injured. See
infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
4. 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1984).
6. 106 S. Ct. at 214.
7. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 158, 695 P.2d 665, 680,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 383 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404
N.E.2d 585, 602 (1980). A third state, Louisiana, had also upheld a damage cap under
federal constitutional attack. See Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.
1985) ($500,000 limitation does not violate due process and equal protection guarantees
of Constitution).
8. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 941-43, 424 A.2d 825, 836-38 (1980); Arneson
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio
Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Comm. Pl. 1976); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984). The court in Simon invalidated Ohio's provision in dicta.
9. The Supreme Court expressly left this issue open in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In Duke an environmental organization and
individuals who lived near partially constructed nuclear power plants brought suit seek-
ing a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 59. This Act
limited the total liability that a defendant could incur in the event of a nuclear accident
to $560 million. Id. The Court held that the Price-Anderson Act violated neither the
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The Supreme Court must eventually decide the validity of statutory
limitations on medical malpractice recoveries. Over one-quarter of the
states have enacted such damage limits,10 but state courts disagree on
the constitutionality of these laws. Moreover, the malpractice crisis
that spurred these laws in the 1970s is once again a concern pressuring
many states to enact this type of legislation. I x
II. DIVISION IN THE STATE COURTS
A. Decisions Upholding Medical Malpractice Damage Limits
In Prendergast v. Nelson 12 several health care providers brought a
declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the constitu-
tionality of the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act.13 The suit
due process nor equal protection clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 60-61. The
Court held that it "need not resolve" the question of whether the due process clause
required the Price-Anderson Act to either duplicate a victim's recovery at common law
or provide a reasonable substitute remedy. Id. at 88. According to the Court, this
inquiry was unnecessary because the Act provided a reasonably just substitute for the
common law remedy. Id. at 61. The Court based its conclusion on three aspects of the
law: (1) the law assured a $560 million fund for recovery; (2) Congress made a commit-
ment in the Act to "take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to pro-
tect the public from the consequences of" a nuclear accident; and (3) the statute
required defendants benefitting from the Act to waive certain defenses, which relieved
victims of the need to prove liability. Id.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1983) ($250,000 limit for non-eco-
nomic losses); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54 (1986) ($100,000 limit with participation in
patient's compensation fund); IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1977) ($150,000 limit for total
damages); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, % 101 (Supp. 1978) ($500,000 limit for total dam-
ages); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums 1983) ($500,000 limit for total damages);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299(B)(2) (West 1978) ($500,000 limit for total damages);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 383.110.5 ($350,000 limit for non-economic losses); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2825 (1982) ($500,000 limit for total damages); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6
(1978) ($500,000 limit for total damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-14-11 (1983)
($300,000 limit for total damages); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1981)
($200,000 limit for total damages); S.D. CODIFIED LAvs ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1985)
($1,000,000 limit for total damages); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon
Supp. 1982) ($500,000 limit for total damages); VA. CODE § 8.10-581.15 (Supp. 1983)
($750,000 limit for total damages); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1986) ($1,000,000
limit for non-economic damages).
I1. In 1983 doctors paid approximately $1.7 billion for malpractice insurance, up
17% from 1982. Alternative Medical Liability Act: Hearings on H.R. 5400 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49
(1984) (statement of Rep. Gephardt). From 1974 to 1984, malpractice premiums in-
creased by 13 1%. Id.
12. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to 44-2855 (1982).
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was instituted after the state's Director of Insurance refused to imple-
ment the Act's provisions concerning malpractice limits. 14 The dam-
age limit under the Nebraska Act was $500,000, but a patient could
waive the provisions of the Act before undergoing treatment.15 The
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the $500,000 ceiling was a reason-
able classification based on inherent differences between tort actions in
which the patient elected to come under the Act and those in which the
patient waived the provision of the Act. 6 Because the Act guaranteed
a fund17 for the payment of claims made under its provisions, the court
found the $500,000 ceiling reasonable.'" According to the court, a
claimant who waived the Act and proceeded under common law had
no such guarantee of payment." Thus, the Court held that the Act did
not violate the equal protection clause because the limitation was rea-
sonable in light of the benefit also conferred by the statute. In addition,
the elective nature of the Act undoubtedly played a key role in the
decision.2°
Unlike the Nebraska statute, the medical malpractice damage cap at
issue in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.21 was nonelective.22 The
Indiana Supreme Court noted that the state's $500,000 damage limita-
tion imposed a burden on those persons damaged in excess of $500,000,
but no such burden existed for those having smaller claims.23 In deter-
mining whether the burden violated equal protection, however, the
court applied the rational basis test.24 Because medical malpractice
tort victims are not a suspect class and the victim's interest in being
fully compensated is not a fundamental interest, the court held that the
14. 199 Neb. at 100, 256 N.W.2d at 662.
15. Id. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821.
16. Only three of the seven justices subscribed to this portion of the decision. One
justice thought the issue was nonjusticiable, while three justices believed the limitation
was unconstitutional as special legisiation.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2829. An annual surcharge on each qualified health care
provider establishes the fund. Each health care provider is responsible for any malprac-
tice claims up to $100,000. Id. § 44-2825. The fund pays claims between $100,000 and
$500,000. Id.
18. 199 Neb. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
22. IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 16-9.5-10-5 (Bums 1983).
23. 273 Ind. at 397, 404 N.E.2d at 600.
24. Id.
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classification need only have a "fair and substantial" relationship with
the purpose of the legislation.z5 The court found such a relationship
between the $500,000 limit and the promotion of health care.26 The
cap gave health care providers an incentive to participate in the patient
compensation fund,27 a risk-spreading mechanism designed as a partial
alternative to private insurance.28 Moreover, the limitation facilitated
the determination of the annual surcharge paid by health care provid-
ers to the fund.29
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors30 the Louisiana Supreme Court also
applied the rational basis test3 to a $500,000 statutory limitation on
medical malpractice damages.32 The court held that the state's objec-
tive in assuring the continued availability of quality health care was a
legitimate goal and found that the legislature could have rationally de-
cided that the Act would promote the state's objective.33 The court
distinguished other cases that invalidated limitations on medical mal-
practice recoveries, noting that those courts specifically found no ac-
tual medical malpractice crisis in their respective states at the time the
legislatures passed the statutes.34 Thus, according to the court, the
25. Id.
26. Id. at 398, 404 N.E.2d at 601. The court stated:
The Legislature could have reasonably considered a set limitation upon recov-
eries to be an essential part of any operable plan to spread the risk of loss to partici-
pating health care providers and to regulate the cost of them, and thereby meet the
danger it perceived to the public welfare .... [W]e find a rational justification for
the difference in treatment accorded the various groups identified within the ration-
ality of the program launced by the Legislature to protect vital societal interests.
Id.
27. Id. Annual surcharges on all health care providers in Indiana creates the fund.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-4-1 (Burns 1983). Each physician must be insured in the
amount of $100,000 per occurrence, and $300,000 in the annual aggregate. The fund
pays claims in excess of a health care provider's insurance coverage. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16.9.5-2-6 (Burns 1983).
28. 273 Ind. at 398, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
29. Id.
30. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
31. Id. at 155-57.
32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39(B) (West Supp. 1985). The Louisiana Act
is substantially similar to the Indiana Act. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying
text (discussion of Indiana Act).
33. 462 So. 2d at 156.
34. Id. at 156 n.8. The court noted that the courts in Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978), and Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983), each found
that "no actual medical malpractice existed in those states and therefore the legislative
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statutory limitations could not possibly further those statutes' goal of
combating the malpractice crisis.3 5
The malpractice limitation at issue in Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group3 6 differed substantially from the limitations upheld in Nebraska,
Indiana, and Louisiana. The California statute limited non-economic
losses to $250,000. 37 In Fein an attorney sued a partnership of physi-
cians for failing to diagnose and prevent his heart attack. 3' The jury
awarded Fein almost $800,000 for lost wages and medical expenses,
and an additional $500,000 for non-economic damages.39 Applying
the California statute, the trial court reduced the non-economic dam-
age award to $250,000.'" Fein challenged this reduction on both due
process and equal protection grounds.4 1 He claimed that the statute
violated his due process rights by limiting the potential recovery of
medical malpractice claimants without providing an adequate benefit
to compensate for the limitation.42 Because the statute impinged upon
economic rights, the court required that it merely be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.43 The court held that due process did not
require the state to provide quid pro quo to justify the statute.44 More-
over, according the court, even if due process required compensatory
solution obviously could not further the stated aims of the statutes." 462 So. 2d at 156,
n.8.
35. Id.
36. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1983) provides: "(a) In any [medical
malpractice] action ... the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigure-
ment and other nonpecuniary damage. (b) In no action shall the amount of damages for
noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)."
38. 38 Cal. 3d at 144, 695 P.2d at 670, 211 Cal. Rptr., at 373.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 145-46, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
41. Id. at 157, 162, 695 P.2d at 679, 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 385.
42. Id. at 157, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
43. Id. at 158, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383. The court relied in part on
Werner v. Southern California Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950), in
which the court applied a rational basis test to a statute that allowed recovery of "spe-
cial damages" only for a plaintiff bringing a libel or slander action against a newspaper.
Damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt feelings ("general dam-
ages") were not recoverable. The Fein court noted that "[t]he 'general damage/special
damage' distinction ... is similar to the 'noneconomic damage/economic damage' dis-
tinction established by section 3333.2." Id. at 158 n.15, 695 P.2d at 680 n.15, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 383 n.15.
44. Id. at 158, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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benefits, a viable medical malpractice insurance industry was an ade-
quate benefit for the legislation's detrimental effect on malpractice
plaintiffs.45
Fein also challenged the reduction on the grounds that it violated his
equal protection rights by discriminating within the class of medical
malpractice victims.4 6 The court held, however, that the legislature
had a reasonable basis for drawing a distinction between economic and
non-economic damages.4 7 The court recognized evidence showing that
the consumer bears the cost of non-economic damages.48 Thus, the
court held that the legislature could have reasonably concluded that
such damages should be limited.49 Additionally, the court found that
the legislature reasonably could have determined that an all-inclusive
limit would provide a more stable base on which to calculate insurance
rates.50 The court also noted that the fixed $250,000 limit would pro-
mote settlements by eliminating "the unknown possibility of phenome-
nal awards for pain and suffering that can make litigation worth the
gamble."'51
45. Id. at 160 n.18, 695 P.2d at 681-82 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.18.
46. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr at 385. Fein actually posited two
equal protection arguments. First, he claimed that the statute violated equal protection
by discriminating between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims, because
the limit on non-economic damages applied only in medical malpractice cases. Second,
he argued that the statute impermissibly discriminated against the class of medical mal-
practice victims by barring recovery only to those whose non-economic damages exceed$250,000. The court quickly disposed of the first contention by noting that the legisla-
ture was responding to a medical malpractice insurance crisis, and that it was therefore
rational to treat medical malpractice tort victims differently than other tort victims. Id.
47. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
48. Id. at 159, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
49. Id. at 160, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The court distinguished those
cases that had invalidated limitations on medical malpractice damages:
With only one exception, all of the invalidated statutes contained a ceiling which
applied to both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, and several courts-in
reaching their decisions-were apparently considerably influenced by the potential
harshness of a limit that might prevent an injured person from even recovering the
amount of his medical expenses.
Id. at 161, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385. The "one exception" that the court
referred to is Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). However, the
court had little trouble distinguishing Carson, recognizing that the New Hampshire
court applied an intermediate scrutiny standard of review. The Fein court found such a
standard inconsistent with California's standard. Id. at 161 n.19, 695 P.2d at 682 n.19,
211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.19.
50. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
51. Id. (citing Brief of Amicus). As a final rationale, the Fein court remarked that
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B. Decisions Invalidating Medical Malpractice Damage Limits
The first case to decide the validity of a medical malpractice damage
cap was Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association.5" Although
the plaintiff challenged the $500,000 limitation on federal constitu-
tional grounds,53 the court found it unnecessary to decide these is-
sues.54 Instead, it concluded that the limitation violated the state
constitution as arbitrary and as a special law.55 In disposing of the
case, however, the court addressed the hospital association's argument
that the statute provided a quid pro quo for the loss of recovery by
lowering medical care costs for all recipients of medical care. 6 The
court stated that this quid pro quo does not extend to the seriously
injured medical malpractice victim who might not recover all of his
medical expenses.5 7
In Jones v. State Board of Medicine5" the Idaho Supreme Court
reached the federal constitutional issues but found the record insuffi-
cient to render a decision.59 In Jones several physicians and hospitals
brought a declaratory judgment action against the state board of
"the legislature simply may have felt that it was fairer to malpractice plaintiffs in gen-
eral to reduce only the very large noneconomic damage awards, rather than to diminish
the more modest recoveries for pain and suffering and the like in the great bulk of
cases." Id. Chief Justice Bird's dissenting opinion found this justification strange:
The notion that the Legislature might have concentrated the burden of medical
malpractice on the most severely injured victims out of considerations of fairness
certainly has the advantage of originality.... If 'fairness' can justify the present
limit, it is hard to imagine a statute that could be invalidated under the majority's
version of equal protection scrutiny.
Id. at 174, 695 P.2d at 691, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
52. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
53. Id. at 308, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
54. Id. at 316, 347 N.E.2d at 739.
55. Id. at 318, 347 N.E.2d at 741-43. The court stated:
Although we do not hold or even imply that under no circumstances may the
General Assembly abolish a common law cause of action without a concomitant
quidpro quo, we have consistently held that to the extent that recovery is permitted
or denied on an arbitrary basis a special privilege is granted in violation of the
Illinois Constitution.... We are of the opinion that limiting recovery only in
medical malpractice actions to $500,000 is arbitrary and constitutes a special law in
violation of section 13 of article IV of the 1970 Constitution ....
Id. at 320, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
56. Id. at 319, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
57. Id.
58. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
59. Id. at 876, 555 P.2d at 416.
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medicine, seeking a declaration that the state's damage limitation6" was
unconstitutional. The court held that a recovery limit satisfies equal
protection standards only if it bears a fair and substantial relationship
to the asserted purpose of the act.61 The asserted purpose of the Idaho
Act was to alleviate the alleged medical malpractice crisis in the
state.62 Because the record did not contain factual information indicat-
ing whether or not a malpractice crisis actually existed the Idaho at the
time of the Act's passage, the court remanded the case for further fac-
tual determinations.63
The North Dakota Supreme Court was the first court to invalidate a
medical malpractice damage limit on federal constitutional grounds.'
In Arneson v. Olson65 the statute at issue limited medical malpractice
recoveries to $300,000.66 Although the limitation did not apply unless
a patient consented to its provisions, 67 the court accorded this factor
60. IDAHO CODE § 39-4204, -4205 (1977) (repealed 1981).
61. 97 Idaho at 871, 555 P.2d at 413-14.
62. Id. at 862, 555 P.2d at 402.
63. Id. at 876, 555 P.2d at 416.
64. A $200,000 damage limitation was invalidated on federal constitutional grounds
with surprisingly little discussion in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.
3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Comm. P1. 1976). Relying on Graley v. Satayatham, 343
N.E.2d 832 (Comm. P1. 1976), which had invalidated other portions of Ohio's Medical
Malpractice Act, the court found that the damage cap violated equal protection. 355
N.E.2d at 912. The portion of the opinion invalidating the damage cap was only dicta,
however, because the plaintiff had not prayed for damages in excess of $200,000. Id. at
905. Nevertheless, Simon is significant because it was the first case to purportedly inval-
idate a medical malpractice damage cap on federal constitutional grounds.
In Graley the court invalidated certain pleading requirements as conflicting with the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the elimination of the collateral source rule
in medical malpractice cases violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Concerning the equal protection claim, the court held:
There is no satisfactory reason for this separate and unequal treatment.... To
articulate the requirement is to demonstrate its absurdity, for at one time or an-
other every type of profession or business undergoes difficult times, and it is not the
business of government to manipulate the law so as to provide succor to one class,
the medical, by depriving another, the malpracticed patients, of the equal protec-
tion mandated by the constitution.
343 N.E.2d at 837.
65. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-11 (1978) (repealed 1983).
67. Id. § 26-40.1.04. This provision provided that a patient or his representative
could elect to be bound by the terms of the statute by signing an acknowledgement. If a
patient required emergency treatment, the provisions of the statute applied without con-
sent. If the patient did not consent, the physician could decide whether or not to pro-
vide services.
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little weight and found that a physician was under no obligation to
provide care to a patient who refused to consent. 68 Thus, according to
the court, a patient must either consent or travel outside the state to
obtain treatment.69 The court refused to decide whether a state could
limit the right to recover damages without providing a quid pro quo,
and instead held that a state may never arbitrarily limit or eliminate a
pre-existing right.70 The court found that the statute did not even sat-
isfy this lower standard of review.7 1 Although one of the stated pur-
poses of the Act was to eliminate the expense involved in
nonmeritorious malpractice claims,72 the court ruled that the $300,000
limit did nothing to achieve this goal. 3 Rather, the Act reduced meri-
torious and nonmeritorious claims.74 The limitation also did not serve
the stated purpose of assuring the availability of medical services at
reasonable costs.75 The court found that the incidence of malpractice
claims in North Dakota was far lower than the national average.
7 6
Moreover, premiums in North Dakota were the sixth lowest in the
country.7 7 Because North Dakota was not experiencing an availability
or cost crisis, the court held that the Act violated the equal protection
clause in that it could not possibly achieve its stated purposes.78
The damage cap at issue in Carson v. Maurer,79 similar to that up-
held in Fein, limited damages for non-economic losses to $250,000.80
New Hampshire modeled its damage limit after California's statute. 1
68. 270 N.W.2d at 134.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 135.
71. Id.
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-01 stated that the purposes of the Act were:
[T]o assure the availability of competent medical and hospital services to the public
in North Dakota at reasonable costs; to provide prompt and efficient methods for
eliminating the expense involved in nonmeritorious malpractice claims; to provide
adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims; and to encourage phy-
sicians to enter the practice of medicine in North Dakota and remain in such prac-
tice as long as they are qualified to do so.
73. 270 N.W.2d at 135-36.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 136.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 135.
79. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
80. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7II (Supp. 1979).
81. 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, struck down the law on
equal protection grounds.82 The court found a weak relationship83 be-
tween rate reduction and the means chosen to attain the goal for two
reasons. First, damage awards constitute only a small part of total in-
surance premium costs. Second, few individuals suffer non-economic
damages in excess of $250,000.84 The court found that these facts indi-
cated the damage limit would do little to reduce premiums. The court
also expressed concern that the Act placed the burden of rate reduction
on those most seriously injured."
The most recent case to invalidate a medical malpractice damage
limitation was Baptist Hospital v. Baber.86 The Baber court, relying on
Arneson v. Olson,87 summarily struck down Texas' $500,000 damage
cap as violative of equal protection.88 The court noted that several
courts had relied on the presence or absence of a quid pro quo to the
disadvantaged class as a factor in their decision.89 Although the court
recognized that the Supreme Court has never imposed such a require-
ment,90 it held that the presence of a quidpro quo would strengthen the
statute's constitutionality.91 The court then found that the hospital
82. Id.
83. Unlike the other courts that invalidated their medical malpractice acts using the
rational basis test, the Carson court applied intermediate scrutiny in reviewing the pro-
visions of its statute. Id. Under intermediate scrutiny, the means used by the legisla-
ture must be substantially related to achievement of important state objectives. See
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
84. 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
85. Id. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837. The court stated: "It is simply unfair and unrea-
sonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon those
persons who are most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation."
Id.
86. 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1984).
87. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
88. 672 S.W.2d at 298. The holding was limited to hospitals, the only defendant in
the case. Id.
89. Id. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 97 Idaho
859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Assoc., 63 Il. 2d 313, 347
N.E.2d 736 (1976).
90. The Supreme Court expressly left open the question of whether due process
requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quidpro quo for the com-
mon law remedy it replaces in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978).
91. 672 S.W.2d at 298.
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failed to show any such quid pro quo.92
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY LIMITS ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Although victims of malpractice challenge damage limits on a vari-
ety of grounds, courts are most receptive to challenges based on due
process or equal protection. If the Supreme Court acts in this area, the
federal question requirement 93 dictates that its decision will be based
on one of these grounds.
A. Due Process
Most courts addressing the constitutionality of medical malpractice
damage limitations question whether the scheme confers an adequate
quid pro quo to compensate the malpractice victim's loss of his com-
mon law remedy. Because under common law no limit exists on the
amount of recoverable damages,94 a scheme violates due process if it
displaces the common law remedy without conferring some benefit on
the victim. 95 Several courts conduct this inquiry pursuant to an equal
protection challenge, concluding that if a scheme unreasonably bur-
dens fundamental rights, it also violates equal protection.96 Because
this theory derives from substantive due process, the analysis is essen-
tially the same.
The primary benefit offered as justification for the quid pro quo re-
quirement is that damage caps reduce the liabilities of health care prov-
iders, resulting in lower malpractice insurance premiums. This
lowered liability insures that quality health care will be available in the
state at a reasonable cost. Although conflicting evidence exists, most
litigants do not dispute that some benefit may accrue to patients by
limiting the liability of health care providers.9 7 The primary question
92. Id.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
94. The only limitation is one of reasonableness. Under common law principles a
judge is obligated to reduce a damage award that is not in accordance with the evidence.
See, e.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 180-81, 417 P.2d 673, 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129,
137 (1966). The judgment at least afford the plaintiff opportunity to make remittitur to
avoid a new trial. See, e.g., Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 997 (1952).
95. See supra notes 41-45, 56-57 and accompanying texts.
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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is whether lower medical costs for all health care recipients adequately
benefit the severely injured malpractice victims who must bear the bur-
den of such reductions. Because state courts disagree on the answer to
this constitutional question, the Supreme Court must give guidance.
The Baber,98 Carson, 99 and Arneson 1 00 courts specifically found that
lower medical costs for all health care recipients do not adequately
compensate the severely injured malpractice plaintiff.1 1 The Arneson
court held that the recovery limitation does not provide adequate com-
pensation to patients with meritorious claims, but instead detrimentally
affects the most seriously injured claimants.10 2 Perhaps more realisti-
cally, the Carson court recognized that the malpractice plaintiff re-
ceived some compensation in the form of lower medical costs, but
found such compensation totally inadequate. The court held that im-
posing the burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon
the most severely injured and economically needy was both unfair and
unreasonable. 103
Alternatively, the Fein and Johnson courts found that the preserva-
tion of health care services adequately justified the burden imposed on
malpractice plaintiffs. "4 The Fein court held that "even if due process
principles required some quid pro quo to support the statute, it would
be difficult to say that the preservation of a viable medical malpractice
insurance industry in this state was not an adequate benefit for the det-
riment the legislation imposes on malpractice plaintiffs."' ' * The John-
son court went even further, reasoning that many malpractice plaintiffs
will continue to depend upon health care providers for the rest of their
lives to treat the injuries resulting from prior negligence.10 6 Thus, the
availability of health care services may benefit the malpractice plaintiff
more than the average citizen.
The Fein and Johnson opinions place too much emphasis on the as-
sertion that availability of health care services through lower premiums
98. Baber, 672 S.W.2d at 298.
99. Carson, 120 N.H. at 941-43, 424 A.2d at 837-38.
100. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 134-35.
101. See supra notes 64-92 and accompanying text.
102. 270 N.W.2d at 135.
103. 424 A.2d at 837.
104. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 160 n.18, 695 P.2d at 681-82 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385
n.18.
105. Id.
106. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 396, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
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adequately compensates the malpractice plaintiff. Malpractice premi-
ums constitute less than one percent of the nation's health care bill. 107
Strong evidence also indicates that medical costs rise regardless of mal-
practice legislation and a decline in insurance premiums.108 For exam-
ple, malpractice premiums rose steadily in California prior to the
enactment of the medical malpractice damage limit, and decreased of
three years after.109 Between 19751"0 and 1981, however, the cost for a
hospital stay increased from $217 to $547 per day."' Thus, the theory
that decreased malpractice premiums will in turn reduce medical costs,
a theory that courts and even litigants have freely accepted, is dubious.
Even if correct, this premise should be entitled to little weight. The
fact that many health care providers can continue to operate or that
medical costs will be lower hardly compensates the severely injured
plaintiff. A plaintiff whose damages have been reduced by $300,000
takes little comfort in knowing that his doctor's bill is $10 cheaper.
B. Equal Protection
Medical malpractice damage limits also implicate the equal protec-
tion clause. First, the statutes distinguish between tort victims in gen-
eral and medical tort victims. Second, the statutes distinguish between
classes of medical tort victims-those whose damages are less than the
fixed recovery limit and those whose damages exceed the limit. Courts
faced with equal protection challenges to medical malpractice damage
limits must initially decide which standard of review to apply. The
courts disagree on the proper standard" 2 and need the Supreme Court
to provide guidance.
Despite their differences, the state courts agree that damage caps
should not be subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the
legislative act be necessary to achieve a compelling government inter-
107. Zaremski & Weibel, There Is No Answer to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 6 J.
LEGAL MED. 265, 266 (1985). Medical malpractice premiums cost the nation $3 billion
per year, while the nation spends more than $300 billion per year on health care. Id.
108. See generally Greenwald & Mueller, Medical Malpractice and Medical Costs,
in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 65 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
109. See Neubauer & Henke, Medical Malpractice Legislation, 21 TRIAL 64, 65
(1985). The statistics in this article were based on a California Hospital Association
study involving 420 of the state's 650 hospitals. Id.
110. Id. California passed its statute in 1975.
111. Id.
112. See infra note 115.
Washington University Open Scholarship
330 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:315
est." 3 Courts apply strict scrutiny when a statute either burdens fun-
damental rights or creates a suspect classification.114  Because a
person's interest in recovering malpractice damages in excess of a
stated amount is not fundamental, strict scrutiny is not warranted.
Strict scrutiny is also inapplicable under the suspect classification
prong. The classifications created by medical malpractice damage limi-
tations are not within the narrowly defined classifications recognized
by the Supreme Court as suspect.
The states disagree, however, on whether to apply the rational basis
test or some type of intermediate level scrutiny." 5 The rational basis
test merely requires that a statute be rationally related to achieving a
legitimate state objective.' 6 Courts commonly apply the test to social
or economic regulations. 117  Intermediate level scrutiny varies, but
commonly requires that a statute be substantially related to achieving
important state objectives.'1 8 Court apply the intermediate level scru-
tiny to some gender,1 9 illegitimacy,' 20 and alienage classifications.121
Although both the Arneson and Johnson courts applied intermediate
scrutiny, each did so for different reasons. The court in Arneson ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny because it had earlier applied that standard
in evaluating the state's automobile guest statute,122 which it consid-
113. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
114. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
115. The courts in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978), and Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980), applied intermediate level
scrutiny although they reached opposite results. The courts in Fein v. Permanente
Medical Groups, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985), Sibley v.
Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985), Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424
A.2d 825 (1980), Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d
903 (Comm. P1. 1976), and Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984), applied the rational basis test.
116. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Gunther,
supra note 113, at 20.
117. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488-89; McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
118. See Craig v. Boren, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
119. Id.
120. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
121. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
122. See Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1974) (holding North
Dakota's automobile guest statute unconstitutional).
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ered similar to the damage limitation. The Johnson court applied a
"fair and substantial relationship" test because it construed the
Supreme Court to have applied that standard in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group.123 Little justification exists for
applying such heightened scrutiny. The medical malpractical damage
limitations discriminate against all classes, unlike discrimination
against gender, illegitimacy, or alienage classifications.124 Medical
malpractice tort victims have not historically experienced discrimina-
tion. Nor are these victims politically powerless to influence
lawmakers. Lawyers, a group sympathetic to medical malpractice
plaintiffs, have considerable influence over legislatures. Damage caps
are more akin to social or economic regulations, and courts should
evaluate them under the rational basis test.
Even under the rational basis test, however, many states' damage
limits should fail. For a damage cap to be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state purpose, the state must have suffered from a malpractice
insurance crisis justifying the damage limitation. The state's goal of
reducing premiums is not valid if a crisis never existed. Considerable
evidence demonstrates that malpractice crises never existed in many of
the states with medical malpractice damage limits.125 Insurance repre-
sentatives who sell malpractice insurance testified before the Subcom-
mittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare that
the cost and availability of malpractice insurance was a serious prob-
lem in only nine states. 26 Of the fifteen states that have enacted dam-
age caps, only four were listed among the nine "crisis states." '127 Thus,
123. See supra note 9.
124. Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), indicates that
legislation directed at discrete and insular minorities may warrant heightened scrutiny
because such legislation "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities. Id. at 153 n.4. Here, medical malpractice plain-
tiffs are not such a minority.
125. See infra note 126.
126. Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 869-
70 (April 7-15, 1975).
127. The nine states were Alaska, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Michi-
gan, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio. The four "crisis states" that have enacted
damage limitations are California, Florida, Indiana, and Ohio. See supra note 10. Sev-
eral states that have enacted damage limitations did so some time after these hearings.
Presumably, a malpractice insurance crisis could have developed in these states during
the intervening period.
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when a state responds to an undocumented malpractice crisis, courts
should strike down the legislation because the state's goal is not valid.
IV. CONCLUSION
The states are currently in sharp disagreement over the validity of
medical malpractice damage limitations. In due process terms, the
courts disagree on whether a compensation scheme requires an ade-
quate quid pro quo for the common law remedy it replaces. If so, the
question remains whether the availability of health care or reduced
medical costs constitute an adequate quid pro quo. Due process re-
quires such quid pro quo, and the availability of health care at reduced
costs does not constitute adequate consideration to malpractice vic-
tims. In terms of equal protection, the courts disagree on the proper
standard of review. Moreover, the question of whether a malpractice
crisis existed in several states is the subject of conflicting evidence. For
medical malpractice compensation schemes, the rational basis test is
appropriate, but even this test is not met by many of the states that
have enacted medical malpractice damage limits. Unless the Supreme
Court acts in this area, the law will continue to produce conflicting
results.
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